When The Small Dragon Met The Big One
Part I
The meeting between Prime Minister Jigmi Y. Thinley of Bhutan
and Premier Wen Jiabao of China on 21 June 2012, on the sidelines of the Rio+20
Summit in Brazil, sprung a surprise for most India-Bhutan-China watchers.
It stirred the calm waters of Bhutan-India relations.
With headlines like ‘China’s coziness with Bhutan rings security
alarm for India’, the Indian media spread such panic that many Indians thought
Bhutan was on the verge of severing its old ties with India for a new romance
with China. Security analysts and strategists reviewed the Chumbi Valley
triangle, saying this was the first bold move by the Bhutanese government after
the signing of the revised Indo-Bhutan Friendship Treaty in February 2007.
This write-up tries to analyze the meeting of the two dragons in
a broader perspective of India-Bhutan-China relationship.
What did the two leaders discuss?
Bhutan shares about 470km of border with China in the
north. Therefore, the only reason Bhutan and China occasionally met in
the past had been the border talks. This was the first meeting between
the heads of the two governments.
The most reliable sources, regarding what the two leaders
discussed, are the websites of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) of the
People’s Republic of China and Bhutan’s Cabinet Secretariat.
The Chinese MoFA site states that Premier Wen Jiabao told Prime
Minister Jigmi Y. Thinley that China was ready to forge formal diplomatic
relations with Bhutan, complete border demarcation at an early date, and
strengthen exchanges in various fields.
The site notes that PM Jigmi Y. Thinley said his meeting with
Premier Wen carries “great historic significance, as it marks the first meeting
between the heads of the two governments. (…) Bhutan firmly sticks to the
one-China policy, and has strong desire to strengthen understanding of and
friendship with China. Bhutan wishes to forge formal diplomatic ties with China
as soon as possible, and is willing to settle border issues with China in a
cooperative manner, enhance bilateral economic and trade cooperation….”
On the other hand, Bhutan’s Cabinet Secretariat website notes:
“Prime Minister Lyonchhen Jigmi Y. Thinley met Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in
Rio De Janeiro today (June 21) on the sidelines of the Rio+20 Summit. (…) They
discussed bilateral issues of mutual interest and multilateral cooperation,
including Bhutan’s bid for a non-permanent seat on UN Security Council for the
term 2013-2014, elections for which are to be held in fall this year.”
In the wake of the meeting, New Delhi is supposed to have called
up Thimphu for details of the discussion. A Chinese delegation had also
reportedly visited Bhutan before the Rio+20 Summit.
Reaction in India
Now read this dramatic introduction to an article by Indrani
Bagchi, diplomatic editor of the Times of India: “India confronts a
new strategic situation in its neighborhood, as its staunchest ally Bhutan
prepares to establish full diplomatic ties with China. Until now, Bhutan had
been the only South Asian country, where China did not have a presence. That is
about to change.”
In plain language, the elephant was not terrifically happy about
Prime Minister Jigmi Y. Thinley’s hobnobbing with Premier Wen Jiabao. It
augured new twists in India-Bhutan-China diplomacy.
While many Indian citizens thought the move was a snub from an
“an Indian territory/protectorate country”, others blamed the naiveté on the
part of the Indian foreign policymakers, who thought Bhutan would “remain
strapped to India’s coattails forever”. Some cautioned that the Rio
meeting of Bhutan and China revealed the longstanding fissure in India’s South
Asia policy. Some believed there are “nuclear weapons and Agni missiles
all over Bhutan, and China can do nothing to Bhutan”.
Most of these reactions came from people outside the corridor of
powers, people from outside the South Block. For them, it was an open
interpretation – a change of policy on the part of Bhutan.
Reaction in Bhutan
Bhutan’s new dreams are based on the pervasive belief among its
educated citizenry that the country has come of age and that, as an independent
sovereign state, the country is ready for self-determination. Further,
the revised Indo-Bhutan Friendship Treaty opens up new possibilities for
Bhutan. The mood before the revision of the treaty was summed up as:
“Bhutan is not only landlocked but, more importantly, it is
India-locked.” Therefore, the revised treaty was seen as a release from
an iron clutch. Suddenly, Bhutan need not seek India’s consensus to forge
new diplomatic ties.
Article 2 of the 1949 treaty, in effect until February 2007,
states: “The Government of India undertakes to exercise no interference in the
internal administration of Bhutan. On its part, the Government of Bhutan agrees
to be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its external
relations.”
In the February 2007 Treaty, Article 2 was revised as: “In
keeping with the abiding ties of close friendship and cooperation between
Bhutan and India, the Government of the Kingdom of Bhutan and the Government of
the Republic of India shall cooperate closely with each other on issues
relating to their national interests. Neither Government shall allow the use of
its territory for activities harmful to the national security and interest of
the other.”
Within Bhutan, resentment had been building among the educated
lot about Article 2 of the 1949 treaty, and the country’s economic
vulnerabilities, given that India dictates everything about its gateways in the
south, and up north, along its 470km or so border, is a cold wall of
silence. Thus, at least in the last 10 years or so, many Bhutanese had
expressed the necessity for the country to open up to China. An Indian
citizen probably best sums up what Bhutanese are increasingly feeling: “Bhutan
has long lived in India’s shadow, and you can’t blame them for stepping out and
exploring other avenues of trade and political ties.”
Today, Bhutanese feel the country must diversify its
engagements, while continuing to maintain its strong ties with India.
Many see economic opportunities, especially in terms of FDI inflows and
infrastructure development. Some even say that Bhutan, like many other
developing countries in Asia and Africa, must also benefit from the rise of
China. Moreover, Bhutan’s new economic dreams have been made clearer with
the establishment of its sovereign investment institution, Druk Holding &
Investments, and the launching of its new and liberal FDI policy.
In fact, could Bhutan’s opening up to China be another of its
just-in-time response to the developments already taking place up north?
The economic importance of the railroad – that China has long announced it is
building – from Gyantse to Phari (in the sensitive Yadong county, where Chumbi
valley is located) cannot be underestimated. It may be noted that Phari
was a traditional trading hub for Bhutan, and is about an eight-hour walk from
the Bhutan-China border.
According to the Tourism Council of Bhutan records, Chinese
citizens visiting Bhutan increased to 2,896 in 2011 from 25 in 2002.
Bhutan’s trade with China has also seen a steady increase. According to
Bhutan trade statistics, Bhutan’s import from China stood at Nu 611M in 2010.
However, longtime Bhutan watchers say the country must first
settle its border disputes with China, and then think about exchanging
diplomatic missions.
“Still, should Bhutan ‘trade’ (or be seen to trade) diplomatic
recognition with China, as a perquisite or concurrent factor affecting the
border settlement with that country?” asks Dr Brian Shaw, retired international
relations professor at the University of Hong Kong, who has been keeping an eye
on Bhutan since 1980. “Regardless, Bhutan’s ‘peaceful existence’ must consist
in resolutely maintaining a strong sovereign state presence, not totally
beholden to any neighbouring power.”
An Indo-China expert and international relations professor at
Westminster University in England, Dr. Dibyesh Anand, told a local newspaper in
2010: “…As a matter of principle, Bhutan should work toward a full diplomatic
relations with its northern neighbour. In an international scenario, where
China is a major global power and the key player in Asia, it will be rather
shortsighted for Bhutan not to consider this option earnestly. A formal full
diplomatic relations will facilitate Bhutan in fixing the border with China….”
If some semblance of diplomatic exchange takes place between the
two countries, Bhutan would then become the last South Asian country to open up
to China.
Part II
Even as the new chapter of Bhutan-China relations was opened in
Rio, theories on who took the lead for the meet and who is set to gain what
abound. Does China want diplomatic relations with Bhutan as a ‘quid pro quo’
for border settlement? Does PM Jigmi Y. Thinley think China’s support would be
crucial for Bhutan’s bid for the United Nations Security Council non-permanent
seat? Or was the meeting spurred by India’s new shift in South Asia policy?
Was India behind the Rio move?
A few South Asia think tanks asked if the Rio meeting was
Bhutan’s unilateral decision or one backed by India. One of India’s most
respected newspapers the Hindu believed the initiative had New
Delhi’s support, and that the move meant “a new approach to regional
diplomacy”.
The Hindu quotes Chinese experts with
Beijing-based think tanks like the China Institute of Contemporary
International Relations (CICIR) and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)
saying the move would not have been possible without India’s backing.
“Without Indian permission, Bhutan would not take this step,” says Li Li, a
South Asia scholar at CICIR, a state-run Beijing think-tank.
Experts like Li Li could be right if looked from the prism of
recent positive developments between India and China. For example, as Bhutan
was preparing for its first-ever democratic elections in January 2008, Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh was in Beijing reaffirming President Hu Jintao and
Premier Wen Jiabao about “a shared vision on the 21st Century”. And then in May
2010, former President Pratibha Patil visited China. In fact, it could be said
that the last 10 years have been one of the best periods in the history of
India-China relations. By the way, India also follows ‘one-China’ policy,
favoring the People’s Republic of China over Taiwan.
Is this, therefore, the dawn of India’s new regional diplomacy?
Is this the beginning of a new political discourse for Bhutan?
India’s Bhutan policy
In her essay ‘Political Economy of South Asia’, Edelgard Mahant,
a Canadian academic who teaches political science in York University, describes
Bhutan as India’s only ‘client state’ in South Asia.
For a long time India’s neighborhood policy hinged on political
imperatives, chiefly based on its perceived threat of China. However, that
changed with its economic liberalization and subsequent launch of ‘Look East
Policy’ in 1992. Now, its South Asia policy hinges more on economic imperatives
and cultural diplomacy, what is today known as ‘soft power’ approach.
Bhutan’s friendship with India, to be precise, started with the
visit of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1958, and formal diplomatic ties
were established in 1968. From then on, writes David M. Malone, a
scholar-diplomat and Canada’s High Commissioner to India and non-resident
ambassador to Bhutan and Nepal from 2006 to 2008, “…the essential bargain
between India and Bhutan involved considerable Indian assistance in exchange
for Bhutanese deference to India’s foreign policy and defence concerns, notable
as related to China. (…) Indian troops remain stationed in strategic parts of
northern Bhutan.”
Therefore, India’s policy on Bhutan is an uneven mix of old
‘reciprocity’ approach and the contemporary ‘soft power’ approach. The
‘reciprocity’ approach expects Bhutan to be sensitive to India’s security
concerns even as it reaps huge benefits from its relation with India; the ‘soft
power’ approach is seen in the establishment of Nehru-Wangchuck Cultural Center
and the annual India-Bhutan literary festival called ‘Mountain Echoes’, among
many others. And of course, one shouldn’t forget the substantial financial
support to Bhutan’s five-year plans.
Indian presence in Bhutan is even more pervasive with
construction workers, traders, teachers and hundreds of other occupational
workers. Add to this its sprawling embassy (dubbed the ‘India House Estate’) in
Thimphu, a consulate in Phuentsholing and several Dantak and IMTRAT premises
across the country.
On its part, the Bhutanese government has made it clear that its
relation with India is integral to its national interest. Therefore, the local
media tries its best not to hurt the Indian sentiments. News on Indo-Bhutan
relations is handled sensitively, and India and its policies are not questioned
or criticized publicly. Only on online forums will one see some criticisms of India.
Time for a new South Asia policy?
Many Indian foreign policy analysts have pointed out that India
has failed to lead South Asia. It has also fiercely resisted China’s membership
to South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), although the
country has been granted the observer status. The request for China’s observer
status was made by Pakistan, following which New Delhi invited U.S. to
participate as an observer.
In his book Does The Elephant Dance?: Contemporary
Indian Foreign Policy, David M. Malone notes that “the challenge for Indian
diplomacy lies in convincing its neighbors that India is an opportunity, not a
threat. (…) But has India done enough to make this option attractive? Judging
from (….) its lackluster leadership of SAARC, the answer would have to be not
yet.”
Reviewing Malone’s book, the Economist writes:
“India’s biggest weakness…is in its own region. (…) As the local hegemon it
should be doing much more to foster economic ties and stability all over its
back yard. Instead relations with all its neighbours, with the exception of a
couple of minnows like Bhutan and the Maldives, are mostly sour….”
With its often-dismissive attitude towards its smaller
neighbors, anti-India sentiments have never been clearer in the region. David
M. Malone recalls his conversation with one senior member of India’s security
and foreign policy establishment who tells him that India’s neighbors are mere
“thugs and crooks”.
In his recent opinion piece, the diplomat-politician, Shashi
Tharoor, says New Delhi can no longer turn a deaf ear to the claims that
India’s relations with its neighbors have been ill managed. Using two
negatives, Tharoor writes: “The charge that relations with most of them have
been generally unsatisfactory is not untrue.”
Many South Asia analysts have called on India for renewed
engagement with its neighbors. They say India’s prioritization of relations
with the United States and other global powers has led to increasingly
conspicuous fissures in its relations with the South Asian neighbors.
Look East Policy vs. String-of-Pearls Strategy
India looks at South Asia as its sphere of influence, while
China more or less sees Southeast Asia as its sphere of influence. However,
both have tried to test the uncharted waters and spread their sphere of
influence further. Therefore, by the time the rising China spread its feelers
to South Asia, mostly through economic investments and infrastructure
development, India had already launched its ‘Look East Policy’.
What would eventually result from China’s forays into South Asia
is what the classified Booz-Allen report revealed in 2005 as China’s so-called
“string-of-pearls” or “encirclement” strategy. Today, the “string-of-pearls”
strategy is generally understood as China’s attempt to establish naval bases
and intelligence stations throughout littoral South Asia thereby encircling the
subcontinent. For example, Chinese state-owned corporations have financed
commercial ports in Pakistan (Gwadar), Sri Lanka (Hambantota and Colombo),
Bangladesh (Chittagong) and Burma (Sittwe and Kyaukpyu).
As a result, India has pursued its ‘Look East Policy’ with new
energy and vigor. China recently appeared provoked as the military dimension of
the ‘Look East Policy’ became more pronounced with India seeking closer
military ties with Vietnam and Japan. China, however, at least publicly,
continues to maintain a rather dismissive air towards the ‘Look East Policy’
and the Chinese media have labeled the ‘Policy’ a failure. However, the Chinese
government understands that the ‘Look East Policy’ has both economic and
military dimensions, and that one of its primary objectives is to secure
India’s position in South Asia.
More recently, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has asserted that
“India’s Look East Policy is not merely an external economic policy, it is also
a strategic shift in India’s vision of the world and India’s place in the
evolving global economy. Most of all it is about reaching out to our
civilizational neighbors in South East Asia and East Asia.”
However, some have argued that China’s foray into South Asia
will ultimately force India to seek new avenues of cooperation with its
neighbors and redefine its relations with each of these countries on a more
equal term.
The Sino-Indian relationship, what analysts have called the
“contest of the 21st century”, will continue to rock on a fragile cradle as one
seeks to counter or balance the other’s growing geo-economic and geopolitical
influence in the region.
Last word
As a rookie reporter with Kuensel,
I remember attending an official dinner hosted on behalf of the visiting Chinese
delegation by a foreign ministry director. “You must come to China,” they told
me over the dinner, nodding their heads and grinning. “Sure,” I said. “I would
love to see the Great Wall.” They grinned more. And then, one of them asked the
question the foreign ministry official was probably dreading all evening long:
“Why is your government reluctant to establish formal diplomatic ties with the
Chinese government?” The director played with his spoon and fork, thought for a
while, and said with a beaming smile: “We are already good neighbors even
without formal diplomatic ties.” The Chinese officials looked at him and nodded
their heads in earnest. Only that this time they had no grins on their
stone-like faces.
Note:
(Views expressed are personal and doesn't reflect any individual or institution's stand including organization i work. No lines will be quoted unless permission is granted by author.)
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